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E
conomists traditionally believe that 
the more severe is product liability, 
the greater is the manufacturer’s in-
centive to make its products safe. 
The debate on pharmaceutical liabil-
ity has been whether our legal system is exces-
sively harsh, leading pharmaceutical companies 
to choose safety over effectiveness.  Are drugs 
that should stay on the market being withdrawn 
or not being developed because of the way our 
liability system works?
I have begun to fear that this traditional 
logic is misguided.  It appears that the more 
liability associated with a product, the more 
likely pharmaceutical companies are to leave 
risky products on the market and invest less in 
determining their risks.
Compare the experiences of two pain drugs 
in the same family: Vioxx made by Merck and 
Celebrex made by Pfizer.  After Merck withdrew 
Vioxx from the market, it was inundated with 
litigation.  Pfizer appears to have learned Merck’s 
lesson and adopted a do-little-or-nothing strategy. 
Instead of a recall, Pfizer silently adjusted its 
warnings and instructions to physicians.  Pfizer 
did far less than Merck in terms of consumer 
protection; yet, at least thus far, Pfizer is facing 
nothing that resembles Merck’s liability.
The lesson that the legal system is sending 
to manufacturers in this case is clear.  Do not 
recall a risky product and do not publicize its 
risk.  Consumers and doctors who care about 
product safety should be concerned about this 
effect of the law.
The Vioxx fiasco
Until recently, millions of Americans used Vioxx, the arthritis pain reliever produced 
by the pharmaceutical giant Merck.  It be-
gan as one of the most successful blockbuster 
drugs ever, but, soon after its launch, evidence 
emerged that the drug might be associated with 
increased cardiovascular risk.  In light of this 
evidence and awaiting a more complete risk-
benefit analysis of the drug by the FDA, Merck 
recalled Vioxx from the market late in 2004. 
Soon after, Merck’s legal nightmare began: it 
could potentially become the greatest liability 
episode in pharmaceutical history.  Over ten-
thousand suits have been filed against Merck, 
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with more in the pipeline.  Two of the first 
three suits to reach trial ended up with a ruling 
against Merck.  In one case, the jury awarded a 
single plaintiff $253 million.
The legal issues are difficult to resolve, 
thus it is not clear how individual cases will 
be decided.  In a nutshell, juries are trying to 
answer a simple question: was the injury to a 
given plaintiff caused by the use of Vioxx? Since 
heart attacks occur for a variety of genetic and 
lifestyle reasons independent of the drug, how 
should the law assess the marginal increase in risk
arising from the use of Vioxx?
Many observers have voiced the traditional 
view that imposing a stiff liability on Merck 
would have a clear deterrent effect on 
manufacturers of risky and defective products. 
The message would be clear: “If you leave the 
product on the market, you will end up paying 
for it when the defect is revealed.” For example, 
in a recent editorial in The New England Journal 
of Medicine, the claim was made that “to protect 
the health of the public…civil penalties should 
be commensurate with the scale of drug sales” 
(Psaty and Furberg 2005).  At worst, this line 
of reasoning suggests that costly liability would 
induce excessive safety.  Drugs might be recalled 
even if their benefit exceeds the harm.  But, 
those drugs that remain on the market are more 
likely to be safe.
WhaT’s Wrong WiTh The TradiTional VieW?
Intuitive and compelling as the traditional ar-gument appears at first blush, it may well be 
wrong.  The magnitude of liability that manu-
facturers face post recall provides incentives for 
them to take too little post-sale safety measures 
and, specifically, to issue too few recalls relative 
to the social optimum.  Even more disturbing, 
harsh post-recall liability stifles the incentive to 
monitor and research the risk of products al-
ready in use.  This concern is particularly acute 
concerning products that are associated with 
latent manifestations of harms, such as drugs.
The reason for this counterintuitive effect is 
the following.  Only after a product is launched 
does the manufacturer receive comprehensive 
information about the potential harms and risks. 
Often, this information is not publicly known; 
in fact, much of it can only be assembled by a 
sophisticated information collection effort of the 
manufacturer.  The manufacturer recognizes at 
this interim stage that even if the information 
turns out to be true and the risks materialize, 
it would be difficult for the courts to discern 
whether there is a causal link between the use 
of the product and the harm victims suffered. 
For example, was an individual plaintiff’s cancer 
caused by a defendant’s carcinogenic product or 
by a host of other environmental factors? Did the 
plaintiff’s heart attack result from taking Vioxx 
or from eating greasy burgers? Not only is it 
difficult for juries to make these determinations, 
victims rarely know whom to blame.  This cloud 
of uncertainty provides some protection to the 
manufacturer.
Still, once the manufacturer realizes that the 
product is dangerous, it expects some liability to 
emerge.  Recalling the product, then, would have 
the upside of preventing some future harm, thus 
decreasing some future liability for these prevented 
harms (liability for past-distributed products 
can no longer be reduced.) But—and this is the 
crucial point—recalling the product would have 
the downside of “bursting the floodgates” and 
inviting numerous suits from past users, many of 
which would otherwise not be filed.
what causes this eruption of suits? A recall, 
--
Economists’ Voice     June, 2006
or other high-profile redesign of a product that 
causes harm, is taken as a public “confession” 
on behalf of the manufacturer that the product 
is harmful.  All parties involved “update” their 
assessment of the harmfulness of the product 
and of the expected value of a suit.  Victims will 
now believe that it is more likely that their injury 
resulted from the use of the product and that 
the manufacturer was negligent in selling them 
the defective product.  Judges are more likely to 
suspect that the manufacturer knew about the 
risks all along.  Thus, they might allow broad 
discovery of the manufacturer’s paper trails 
and permit “fishing expeditions” for suspicious 
emails and the like.  Importantly, juries will 
view the confession as resolving the otherwise 
murky issue of causation, thus they are more 
likely to find the manufacturer liable.  And, the 
plaintiff’s attorneys—important catalysts in this 
process—view the public recall announcement 
as an opportunity to launch a more effective 
and coordinated legal assault on the publicly 
vulnerable manufacturer.  In fact, recalls have 
long been the sounding horn for attorneys to 
race to recruit plaintiffs.
This whole process is illustrated by the 
Vioxx case.  In the wake of the recall, lawyers 
have organized coordinated efforts to identify 
Vioxx users through mass email, 1-800 numbers 
(“1-800-LAW-SUIT”), and television ads.  They 
coordinated litigation strategies in conventions 
and other professional circulations, and they 
“shop” for courts that are reputed to be friendly 
to tort plaintiffs.  A little more than a year after 
the recall, the number of suits filed was over ten 
thousand, with close to one-hundred class action 
suits.  Similarly, when another pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, Bayer, recalled its cholesterol drug 
Baycol in 2001, the number of suits rose from 
zero prior to the recall to over fifteen-thousand 
individual lawsuits within two months.  Further, 
when American Home Products withdrew the diet 
drug Fen-Phen in 1997 (following a request by 
the FDA), eighteen-thousand lawsuits were filed!
Surely, if a manufacturer were to leave a 
dangerous product on the market, some of the 
latent harms would eventually lead to lawsuits 
and liability.  However, instead of a “tsunami” 
of lawsuits, as some plaintiff lawyers describe 
the current phenomenon, liability would trickle 
lightly, even if steadily.  without the public 
confession embodied in a high-profile recall, the 
legal system would be less hospitable to plaintiffs. 
Plagued by uncertainty over causation and the 
lack of emotional press coverage, plaintiffs are 
less likely to succeed.  Most victims would not 
even bother to sue.
Thus, the choice for the manufacturer is 
clear: recall the product and suffer an eruption 
of liability for products already sold or remain 
silent and suffer some ongoing liability over a 
longer period of time.  with the phenomenal 
scope of the recall-associated liability, it is 
rational for a manufacturer to leave the product 
on the market.
The effecTs on The discoVery of risks
It is bad enough that product liability law cre-ates this perverse incentive to recall harm-
ful products.  Perhaps even more disturbing 
is the effect on the manufacturer’s incentive to 
research and acquire better information about 
risk.  In our regulatory system, government 
agencies have limited resources or authority to 
collect information about products that have 
already been launched.  The manufacturer, 
then, is the chief actor on whom society relies 
to gather information and update the pool of 
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knowledge.  Here, too, the “floodgates” effect 
of liability hurts, rather than improves, the in-
centives of the manufacturer to research the 
risks and to acquire more accurate informa-
tion.  Because the incentive to use the infor-
mation—even highly accurate information—is 
distorted, the incentive to acquire the informa-
tion is also distorted.
Letters commenting on this piece or others 
may be submitted at 
cgi?context=ev
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